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Abstract
Democracy is an ally of the feminist project and a necessary condition for its success. The European post-crisis context
shows evidence of de-democratization processes that represent a remarkable challenge. This article investigates gender
equality and processes of de-democratization in Spain in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis. It argues that ne-
oliberalism, authoritarian shifts, and political corruption are three key dimensions of the processes of de-democratization
in Spain that contribute to oppose gender equality. However, political contestation and feminist collective agency both
in movements and institutions have played a key role in counteracting these dynamics. Civil society and feminist move-
ments’ struggles for democracy, equality and social justice, the role of new populist left parties in channeling some of
the protesters’ demands, gender equality institutions keeping gender on the agenda despite austerity cuts, and new local
governments emerging from civic platforms after the 2015 elections have been effective in resisting attacks to Spanish
democracy. A thorough revision of academic literature and other secondary sources helps to capture the specificities of
this complex political setting.
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1. Introduction
Democracy is an ally of the feminist project and a nec-
essary condition for its success (International Panel on
Social Progress, 2016). In European countries with re-
cent democratic transitions such as Spain, it has fostered
the reintroduction of women’s citizenship rights after
the dictatorship, the creation of gender equality institu-
tions, and the development of a specific policy and le-
gal framework (Bustelo, 2016). Reflections on the con-
cept of deep democracy establish quality criteria that, if
put into practice, would intensify the positive impacts
on gender equality (Tilly, 2007; International Panel on
Social Progress, 2016; Walby, 2015). Yet, the European
post-crisis context offers a rather different democratic
scenario. Several member states have experienced un-
precedented de-democratization processes that repre-
sent effective oppositions to gender equality, and a chal-
lenge for the feminist project (Aksoy, 2017; Kantola &
Lombardo, 2017a; Krizsan & Roggeband, 2017; Kuhar &
Paternotte, 2017). Still, little is known about the speci-
ficities of this phenomenon across Europe and its gen-
1 This article was written before the fall of Rajoy’s PP conservative government in June 2018 due to a vote of no confidence promoted by the leader of
PSOE socialist party Sánchez.
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eral implications. In this article we study the case of
Spain1 in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis
starting from the following questions: what is the rela-
tion between de-democratization and gender equality
dynamics? And how does the feminist project counter-
act these processes?
Democratization and de-democratization are two
sides of a political process. We argue that neoliberalism,
authoritarian shifts, and political corruption are three
key dimensions of the processes of de-democratization
in Spain that contribute to oppose gender equality. Spain
was at the vanguard in European gender equality policies
previous to the crisis (Valiente, 2006), thanks to the lead-
ing role of some regional governments and the impulse
given by the Zapatero socialist cabinet. Recent changes
have nuanced this situation. The subordination to the EU
neoliberal project of Spanish economic and welfare poli-
cies, the limitation of civil rights to freedomof expression
and women’s autonomy, and the breaches to the rule of
law and embezzling of public money by political authori-
ties are the indicators we use to operationalize the three
dimensions of de-democratization.
While neoliberalism, authoritarian shifts and political
corruption allow us to capture the regression in Span-
ish democracy, the analysis also shows how political con-
testation and feminist collective agency both in move-
ments and institutions have counteracted these dynam-
ics, pushing towards democratization. Civil society and
feminist movements’ struggles for democracy, equality
and social justice, the role of new populist left parties
in channeling some of the protesters’ demands, gender
equality institutions keeping gender on the agenda de-
spite austerity cuts, and new local governments emerg-
ing from civic platforms after the 2015 elections have
been effective in resisting attacks to Spanish democracy.
A thorough revision of academic literature and other sec-
ondary sources helps to capture the specificities of this
complex political setting.
The following two sections introduce our analytical
framework and the three dimensions of de-democratiz-
ation and gender that we consider in this article―neo-
liberalism, authoritarian shifts and political corruption.
The subsequent section, before conclusions, disentan-
gles de-democratization processes in Spain and their re-
lation with feminist struggles for democratization.
2. De-Democratization and Gender: A Framework for
Analysis
Democracy and gender equality are interdependent.
‘The more democracy, the more chances for gender
equality; the more gender equality there is, the more
chances for democracy’ argues Verloo (2016, p. 36). Com-
parative data indicate a correlation between democracy
and the status of women’s health, education, economic
participation and political empowerment (Tripp, 2013).
Democratic polities allowmore freedom to civil societies,
and this increases the influence of women’s organiza-
tions on the state (Htun & Weldon, 2010). In turn, femi-
nistmovements’ ongoing struggles and challenges to pro-
cesses of domination and exclusion contribute to democ-
ratize the political space (International Panel on Social
Progress, 2016). Democracies are also more likely to pro-
mote gender equality than autocracies due to the cre-
ation of citizens that express more egalitarian attitudes
(Inglehart & Norris, 2003), and the existence of women’s
policy agencies and more state funds dedicated to gen-
der equality policies (Tripp, 2013). It is therefore very rel-
evant for the feminist project to detect shifts towards de-
democratization in currently consolidated democracies.
Democracy, in classical political science procedural
definitions such as Dahl’s (1971), has to do with the di-
mensions of ‘contestation’ (freedom to contest the con-
duct of a government) and ‘participation’ (who is in-
cluded in the possibility to control the government). Min-
imum conditions for democratic systems are to present
at least universal male and female suffrage, free, fair,
competitive, and periodical elections, political pluralism,
multi-party competition, freedom of expression, and
different alternative sources of information (Morlino,
2009). While formal features of electoral democracy are
very important, theorists of democratic deepening pro-
pose interpretations of democracy that both incorpo-
rate and go beyond electoral processes. The notion of
‘relational democracy’ developed by Ibarra (2008) con-
ceptualizes democracy as a set of relations between
citizens and decisionmakers that aims at facilitating a
greater convergence between citizens’ demands and po-
litical decision-making. These relations include dynamics
of autonomous social mobilization andmore stable chan-
nels of local participatory democracy, whose limitation
would indicate de-democratization. Gender scholars are
active in the theory of democratic deepening with the
argument that the feminist project requires deep democ-
racy (International Panel on Social Progress, 2016, p. 33;
Walby, 2015, 2009). In deep democracy, contends Ver-
loo (2016, pp. 34–36), not only procedural criteria are
important and need to be expanded for structuring in-
clusive democratic debates, but also the ‘practices and
outcomes’ of democratic rules are essential to allow civil
society’s ongoing contestation of political power and de-
mand to address ‘newly politicized problems’.
In that regard, Morlino (2009) states that a quality
democracy involves procedural, responsiveness and sub-
stantive dimensions. Procedural dimensions of democ-
racy include the rule of law and accountability. The rule
of law requires, according toMorlino (2009), the applica-
tion of law to everybody, no areas dominated by criminal
organization, no corruption in public administration and
political parties, competent, efficient and responsible bu-
reaucracy, efficient police that is respectful of freedoms,
easy and equal access to justice and independence of
judiciary from the influence of political power. Account-
ability takes place through elections, control of the gov-
ernment by the opposition in parliament, by the courts,
and by activities of political parties, media and other
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economic and social organizations. A quality democracy
would also imply responsiveness to citizens’ demands,
full respect and expansion of freedom rights, and sub-
stantive equality in terms of civil, political, and social
rights (Morlino, 2009).
Deep democracy requires state capacity to enforce
its political decisions, according to Tilly (2007, p. 15),
which means that a state is capable ‘to supervise demo-
cratic decision-making and put its results into practice’.
To study democratization and de-democratization as con-
tinuous processes, Tilly (2007, pp. 13–15) proposes four
elements in the political relations between state and citi-
zens that, read together, help to distinguish democratiza-
tion from de-democratization: breadth, equality, protec-
tion, and mutually binding consultation. Breadth refers
to wide political inclusion of people and their expressed
demands; equality refers to extensive equality among
categories of citizens in the translation of their demands
in state action; protections is from the state’s arbitrary
action; and mutually binding consultation means that
‘state agents have clear, enforceable obligations to de-
liver benefits by category of recipient’ and there is no
evidence that ‘seekers of state benefits must bribe, ca-
jole, threaten, or use third-party influence to get any-
thing at all’. Thus, ‘de-democratization’, for Tilly (2007,
p. 14), ‘means net movement toward narrower, more un-
equal, less protected, and less binding consultation.’
Feminist approaches to democracy have contributed
to develop visions of deep democracy from gender and
other equality perspectives (Galligan, 2015; Kantola &
Lombardo, 2017b). Key dimensions of democracy in
these approaches include not only gender balance in po-
litical decision-making but also substantive issues of so-
cial justice. A gender democracy for Galligan (2015) com-
prises dimensions of inclusion and recognition of women
as well as accountability of the state with respect to gen-
der equality commitments. The depth of democracy, ac-
cording to Walby (2015, pp. 115–117, 2009), includes
not only procedures to secure representation of groups
such as women and minorities through quotas, but also
‘the governance ofmajor public services, such as finance,
health, education and care services, through procedures
that are democratically accountable, rather than through
procedures focused on increasing profits for private own-
ers’ (Walby, 2015, p. 116). Democratic control therefore
requires state regulation of markets.
Collective agency is another dimension of democra-
tization that is relevant in feminist debates. The theory
of social movements has conceptualized social mobiliza-
tion, alliances among different movements, and framing
processes to explain political change and democratiza-
tion (Tarrow, 2011) also in times of economic crisis (Della
Porta, 2017). Feminist scholars have shown the democra-
tizing role of feminist struggles for both regimes in tran-
sition to democracy (Tripp, 2013; Waylen, 2007) and de-
democratizing regimes such as Erdoğan’s Turkey (Aksoy,
2017) or Orbán’s Hungary (Krizsan & Roggeband, 2017).
They also show the role of intersectional alliances for de-
mocratizing the European public sphere (Siim & Mokre,
2013). Alliances can also be forged between movement
and institutional actors. Feminist collective agency op-
erates in state structures that enact gender equality
policies and can promote the feminist project particu-
larly when they are connected to feminist movements
(McBride & Mazur, 2013).
Feminist struggles contribute to the project of deep
democracy, argues Verloo (2016). The project of gender
equality is intrinsically political in her view because it in-
volves the ongoing struggle of feminists about the mean-
ing of gender equality intersecting with other inequali-
ties. Feminist struggles work for and at the same time
need deepest forms of democracy because they chal-
lenge hegemonies and marginalizations within and out-
side the movement that can exclude groups and their
demands from the debate. To accommodate these strug-
gles, deep democracy requires not only formal rules but
also effective equality practices and outcomes.
3. Three Aspects of De-Democratization in Post-Crisis
Europe
The above debates tell us that democracy shows shifts to-
wards de-democratization when procedural, responsive-
ness and substantive dimensions are not, or only par-
tially, respected. In this article we limit our analysis to the
following three dimensions of de-democratization that
are relevant to understand gendered developments in
the Spanish 2008 post-crisis context: neoliberalism; au-
thoritarian shifts, and political corruption.
Neoliberalism implies processes of deregulation of
themarket and privatization of public services. This leads
Walby to argue that ‘the neoliberal project of deregula-
tion is a project of de-democratization’ (2015, pp. 117).
Neoliberal logics of governance has led to the transfer-
ence of state powers to non-elected state bodies, pri-
vate enterprises, international organizations and finan-
cial institutions, with negative consequences for demo-
cratic control and management of public services in the
interests of the population (Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht,
2003, pp. 4–7; Hozic& True, 2016).Walby states it clearly:
‘the achievement of democratic depth requires the regu-
lation of finance in the interests of the majority, not the
minority’ (2015, p. 117).
The European austerity agenda designed to enforce
states’ reductions in public spending includes measures
that promote deregulation and liberalization of the la-
bor market, through the reduction of labor rules, the
decentralization of collective bargaining from state to
enterprises, cuts in wages and in social policies (Busch,
Hermann, Hinrichs, & Schulten, 2013). Neoliberalism has
therefore promoted a reduction in the role of the wel-
fare state in favor of the market, with detrimental conse-
quences for gender equality, women, and equality poli-
cies in Europe (Kantola & Lombardo, 2017a; Karamessini
& Rubery, 2014; Walby, 2015). This reduction of the re-
distributive and equalizing capacity of the state in favor
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of the market has also consequences for deep democ-
racy, leading to inequality and de-democratization (Tilly,
2007; Walby, 2015). Although neoliberalism creates
problems for democracy in the absence of regulation, it is
not always the opposite of democratization (for example,
the argument of freemarket contributed to the adoption
of the article on equal pay in the European Community
Treaty of Rome, see van der Vleuten, 2007). However,
in the context of the 2008 economic crisis neoliberalism
has becomemore coercive and dangerous for democracy
(Bruff & Wöhl, 2016).
It is precisely in the context of Europe’s economic
crisis that authoritarian shifts have emerged, represent-
ing another critical dimension of de-democratization. As
Bruff and Wöhl put it ‘it is impossible to understand
the post-2008 period without a central role being ac-
corded to increasingly authoritarian state practices at
a range of scales’ (2016, pp. 93). Although neoliberal-
ism and authoritarianism cannot be automatically con-
nected, in Europe’s post-crisis context austerity politics
have led to processes of de-democratization in EU’s and
member states’ political and economic decision-making
(Kantola & Lombardo, 2017a). EU’s new economic gover-
nance regime has enforced strict rules of fiscal and mon-
etary policies on member states that have bailed out fail-
ing banks. The new economic governance tools, that tie
member states into a commitment to keep their annual
budgetary deficit below 3% and their debt below 60%
of GDP, challenge representative democracies bymoving
powers fromparliamentary to executive branches of poli-
ties both at the national and supranational levels (Bruff
& Wöhl, 2016).
By moving decisions on economic politics away from
Parliaments to less democratic institutions, this neolib-
eral logic of governance has had gender consequences.
It has reduced the spaces of formal politics that women
had formerly achieved (e.g., gender quotas are more of-
ten found for legislative than executive bodies) and has
‘insulated’ decision-making from feminist political con-
testation (Cavaghan, 2017). Similarly, these forms of ‘dis-
ciplinary neoliberalism’ (Gill & Roberts, 2011, pp. 162) re-
shaped the state-market relationship by questioning the
kind of services that are feasible and appropriate for pub-
lic institutions to provide for or the subordination of the
political agenda to the EU economic requirements that
led Eurozone countries to adopt laws or even change
their Constitution ‘partially out of the reach of political
debate and contestation’ (Bruff & Wöhl, 2016; Elomäki
& Kantola, 2017, p. 235). These neoliberal shifts dispro-
portionally affected women, challenging gender regimes
across EU Member States (Walby, 2015).
The rise of authoritarianism is also visible in the
threats to women’s and LGTBQI rights across Europe. Far-
right political parties and movements have actively op-
posed same sex marriage and sexual and reproductive
rights in several countries (Hodzic & Bijelic, 2014; Kuhar
& Paternotte, 2017; Verloo, 2017). Transnational move-
ments against what they call ‘gender ideology’ challenge
liberal democracies by spreading conservative knowl-
edge about gender roles and mobilizing to restrict civil
rights and equality policies (Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017).
Limitations to the rights of participation and mobiliza-
tion are indicators of authoritarian shifts (Ibarra, 2008).
Social movements’ contestation has been undermined
by the political restriction of academic autonomy in Hun-
gary and Turkey―with a specific challenge to gender and
sexuality studies—, or the Spanish ‘gag law’ designed
to criminalize social contestation (International Panel on
Social Progress, 2016). These phenomena contribute to
undermine the rise of feminist activism witnessed in re-
cent years.
Political corruption represents a third critical dimen-
sion of de-democratization. Good quality democracy re-
quires a normal functioning of the rule of law, which
relies not only on the effective application of the legal
framework but also on the pre-eminence of the com-
mon good as a guiding principle of government (Mor-
lino, 2009). Corruption subverts both premises by yield-
ing ‘the supremacy of particular interests in public deci-
sions and, thus, the exercise of authority for the sake of
a few’ (Villoria, Jiménez, & Revuelta, 2014, p. 198). In so
doing, it has deep implications for other democratic di-
mensions such as responsiveness to citizens’ demands or
substantive equality.
Feminist scholars have analyzed the genderedness
of corruption. Initial studies hypothesized that women’s
risk aversion and their more ethical behavior lay be-
hind the correlation between increased female pres-
ence in the political arena and lower levels of perceived
corruption (Dollar, Fisman, & Gatti, 2015). Both exper-
imental and non-experimental studies have neverthe-
less problematized this relationship. The inconsistency
of the results obtained as well as the explanatory capac-
ity of other variables related to the quality of democ-
racy, stressed the need for a less ‘essentialist’ perspec-
tive (Goetz, 2007; Sung, 2012). Feminist institutional-
ism provided here the analytical tools to adopt a non-
individualistic approach to the study of corruption (John-
son, Einasdottir, & Petursdottir, 2013). Informal rules
and ‘logics of appropriateness’ shape women’s capacity
to engage in non-honest behaviors (Frank, Lambsdorff,
& Boehm, 2011). As political outsiders, they lack access
to the all-male networks through which corruption func-
tions. More importantly, this phenomenon becomes the
process ‘through which typically male-dominated elites
transgress proclaimed values of accountability, trans-
parency, and equality’ (Johnson et al., 2013, p. 196).
The gendered effects of corruption are multidimen-
sional. Women suffer a greater impact of these prac-
tices, as they have a more direct contact with the pub-
lic sector and are more vulnerable to inefficient public
services (Stensota, Svensson, & Wängnerud, 2015). Due
to this, they report higher levels of victimization (Vil-
loria et al., 2014). Political corruption also undermines
the effectiveness of gender equality policies. While bud-
get cuts that are connected to the squandering of pub-
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lic funds are likely to hit this policy area first, due to
a general lack of prioritization of gender equality (Lom-
bardo, 2017a), corruption also jeopardizes policy strate-
gies such as gender mainstreaming and electoral quo-
tas. Clientelism has proved to be detrimental to women’s
political recruitment, as the pre-eminence of informal
networks tends to reproduce male dominance in politi-
cal parties (Bjarnegård, 2013). Similarly, the implementa-
tion of gender equality measures included in public pro-
curement regulations remains ineffective if corrupted
practices are in place.
4. Disentangling De-Democratization and
Democratization Processes in Spain
This section disentangles the three de-democratization
dimensions we address in this article―neoliberalism, au-
thoritarian shifts and political corruption―in the case of
Spain, with reference to their gender and democratiza-
tion dynamics.
4.1. Neoliberalism
The neoliberal EU and Spain’s political response to the
economic crisis in terms of austerity negatively affected
democracy, social rights, and gender equality in Spain.
Neoliberal de-democratization hit the Spanish Constitu-
tion in 2011, when the failing banks crisis was trans-
formed into a public debt crisis. Following strong EU pres-
sure from the European Central Bank, through a letter
to former Prime Minister Zapatero including an agenda
of imperative reforms, the socialist government changed
the Constitution by committing Spain to limit its budget
deficit within the EU and member states established tar-
gets, in themiddle of August, through an emergency pro-
cedure with little parliamentary debate (Bruff & Wöhl,
2016; El País, 2014).
Since 2011, the EU and Spain’s austerity politics in re-
sponse to the crisis through National Reform and Stabil-
ity Programs has promoted a neoliberal agenda of cuts to
public budgets and welfare policies, deregulation of the
labor market, tax increases, liberalizations and privatiza-
tions of public services (Lombardo, 2017a). In relation
to gender equality policies, this neoliberal turn led not
only to the restructuring and dismantlement of gender
equality institutions, but also to a significant decrease in
the government’s budget dedicated to gender equality
policies at all governmental levels, reaching less 34.1%
at the central level in the 2009–2013 crisis period (Pa-
leo & Alonso, 2014). Governmental funding dedicated
to policies against gender violence has been decreasing
from 2008 onwards, with the budget laws continuing this
trend with 22.5% in 2016 and freezing funds in 2017 (Go-
bierno de España, 2016). The Spanish welfare state suf-
fered from budget cuts in education, care, social assis-
tance, family policies, and health (Pavolini, León, Guillén,
& Ascoli, 2015). The universality of the health system
was attacked through the cancellation of primary care for
undocumented migrant people (except for emergencies,
children, and pregnancies), that the conservative govern-
ment enforced through the Royal Decree 16/2012 (Lom-
bardo, 2017b).
As Tilly (2007) and Walby (2015) argue, the restric-
tion of social rights and the diminishing governance of
major public services, by reducing the intervention of
the state in the correction of inequalities produced by
the market, through redistribution via democratically ac-
countable procedures, has negative consequences for
the quality of democracy. Yearly reports on the quality
of democracy in Spain’s post-crisis context show that the
experts’ evaluation barely reaches the mark of 5.2 in a
0–10 scale due to the restriction of social rights and the
inequalities that the system produces (Fundación Alter-
nativas, 2015). Data from European and national surveys
show that Spanish citizen’s dissatisfaction with democ-
racy has increased abruptly during the crisis, not only
due to economic hardships but also due to ‘the politi-
cal management of the crisis’ and the ‘intervention in
democratic processes of national and international in-
stitutions and markets, whose legitimacy is questioned’
(Fundación Alternativas, 2015, p. 26).
Democratization and gender dynamics show
women’s resilience and feminist and civil society strug-
gles against neoliberal austerity politics. Despite the
worsening labor market conditions that forced them
into more exploitative situations, the Spanish gender
regime is not becoming more ‘domestic’ yet. Spanish
women’s activity rate is still high―53.4% in 2017 (INE,
2017)―thus showing that women are not ‘going back
home’ (Lombardo, 2017a). Anti-austerity struggles in
Spain connected the defense of social rights and democ-
racy from the beginning of the protest of the Indigna-
dos movement on 15 May 2011. The movement, that
continued through ‘waves’ of civic activism, demanded
‘real democracy’, criticized austerity measures, and sup-
ported welfare policies such as public health, education,
housing, and gender equality (Calvo, 2013; Cruells &
Ruiz, 2014). Feminists have gendered the Indignados
movement and have led important platforms such as
the Platform of people affected by house evictions (PAH)
headed by Ada Colau, who would be elected mayor of
Barcelona in the 2015 municipal elections.
Feminists also developed their own anti-austerity
struggles, through the organization of feminist strikes to
defend a broader concept of both productive and re-
productive work, such as the General Women’s Strike
that in 2018 mobilized 6 million women (see La Van-
guardia, 2018). Finally, austerity pushed feminist orga-
nizations in Spain to intensify their state-level mobiliza-
tion strategies, opening the space to greater democrati-
zation. By 2008 six editions of UN Shadow reports had
been issued by feminist organisations worldwide, a prac-
tice that had begun in 1993. It was not until then that a
group of 17 Spanish feminist organizations drafted their
own Shadow report for the first time. Their second UN
Shadow report from 2013 created a wider platform of
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more than 50 feminist organizations that through a two-
year participatory process produced a Shadow Report
that was signed by 277 Spanish feminist organizations
(San José, 2015). The UN used this Shadow Report to
criticize the Spanish government for the deterioration
of gender equality in the last years and to urge the gov-
ernment to comply with its international commitments
(Lombardo, 2017a; Plataforma CEDAW Sombra-España,
2015). Institutional collective agency at the regional level
has played an important role too in keeping gender equal-
ity on the agenda, as shows the maintenance of bud-
gets dedicated to gender equality in times of austerity by
women’s policy agencies of the Basque Country and An-
dalusia (Alfama, 2017). Feminist agency in movements
and in some regional institutions has thus been crucial
for democratization.
4.2. Authoritarian Shifts
The construction of an ‘emergency’ situation to face the
economic crisis in Europe hasmoved the Spanish govern-
ment to take decisions that are considered authoritarian
shifts, such as the aforementioned fast constitutional re-
form to limit budget deficit (Bruff & Wöhl, 2016). The
quality of Spanish democracy has decreased even fur-
ther under conservative ruling. As Villoria et al. (2014)
argue, the key factor explaining differences in the qual-
ity of government among European regions is the his-
torical development of effective institutional constraints
(parliaments, courts, media) to the power of the exec-
utive. These constraints have weakened in Spain from
2011 onwards. During the first term of the conservative
PrimeMinister Rajoy, his cabinet broke the record of the
number of initiatives approved by Decree-law (García De
Blas, 2015). This type of norm, that the Constitution fore-
sees for cases of ‘extraordinary and urgent need’, implies
shorter periods of debate in parliament and the impos-
sibility for the opposition to present amendments. The
crisis context was used as an alibi to circumvent the leg-
islative branch and reform key policies such as taxation,
employment, and access to healthcare.
Similarly, the conservative government used its ma-
jority to undermine the capacity of parliament to effec-
tively control the government. From 2011 to 2015 the
Partido Popular [Popular Party] (PP) rejected up to 70 pe-
titions of the opposition to enquire the primeminister in
parliament. Rajoy also refused to properly address the
press during that period, declining to be present in press
conferences and to answer questions. He remained thus
rather unaccountable not only for the unpopular auster-
ity decisions taken during the economic crisis but also for
the numerous corruption cases that affected his party.
Weakened constraints to the executive branch and less
accountability were not only detrimental to democracy
but also to gender equality. This is due respectively to the
fact that legal gender quotas in Spain promote women’s
access to the legislative but not the executive branch,
and that the Prime Minister’s lowered accountability re-
duced opportunities for the opposition and the press to
question the government’s budget cuts to welfare and
gender equality policies.
Lack of accountability was only one aspect of de-
democratization. The restriction of freedom of expres-
sion, participation, and other human rights through the
2014 ‘Law of protection of citizens’ security’, or ‘gag law’
as civil society renamed it, has exposed the government’s
undemocratic reaction against the social contestation
that occurred in Spain from the Indignados movement
onwards. The ‘gag law’ limits the freedom of expression,
association, protest, and information, by establishing ad-
ministrative sanctions with high fines for incompliant ac-
tors, by increasing police powers and their testimony in
trial as compared to affected citizens, or by limiting the
freedom of information and collection of proof about
possible police abuse (Gobierno de España, 2015). This
doubtfully democratic law, that has caused citizen and
media sanctions2 and self-censorship, has also had direct
gender impacts due to its effects on the mobilization of
feminist movements and the platform of people affected
by house evictions. Moreover, it has triggered protests
by sex workers’ associations since the increased powers
given to the police have promoted a boost in their abu-
sive behavior and sanctions to sexworkers on the basis of
the law’s articles that punish disobedience or resistance
to authority―for instance,when they resist to show their
identity documents (Borraz, 2016). Authoritarian shifts
also showed in the Catalan secessionist tensions of 1st
October 2017. The police’ disproportionately violent at-
tacks against Catalan citizens voting in a referendum for
independence (which the Constitutional Court declared
unconstitutional) injured hundreds of people and was
criticized by the Human Rights organizations (see Jones
& Burgen, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2017).
Conservative attacks to women’s sexual and repro-
ductive rights in Spain have mostly been perpetrated
by the main conservative party in alliance with ‘pro-life’
grass-roots organizations. The PP government, elected
in 2011, presented a bill to restrict the right to abortion
by reforming the progressive 2/2010 law on sexual and
reproductive health approved under former socialist rul-
ing. The ‘Bill of protection of the life of the embryo and
of the rights of the pregnant woman’ would make abor-
tion illegal and provoke a deterioration of women’s au-
tonomy and health. Strong and continued mobilization
of the Spanish feminist movement, alliances with inter-
national actors, and internal divisions in the conserva-
tive party led the primeminister to withdraw the bill and
forced the resignation of the minister of justice that pro-
posed it (El País, 2014; Lombardo, 2017a; Alonso& Paleo,
2017). The struggle to defend the right of abortion was a
success story for the feminist movement and for democ-
racy, since it showed the importance of political contes-
2 Under the new ‘gag law’, from July 2015 to December 2016, the Spanish police issued more than 22000 and 16000 fines respectively for disrespect and
disobedience to police officers (see Borraz, 2016).
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tation for defending women’s civil rights (Alonso, 2015;
García, 2015). Still, youngwomen’s rights were restricted
through the 2015 reform of the current abortion law so
that women under 18 will need to obtain their parents’
consent to have an abortion.
Moreover, pro-life organizationswere very successful
in seizing the multilevel opportunity structures offered
by the Spanish quasi-federal state (Alonso&Paleo, 2017).
At the time the socialist cabinet drafted Law 2/2010,
these grass-roots groups presented ‘Citizens Legislative
Initiatives’3 in all the Autonomous Communities, claim-
ing the need for policies to support pregnant women and
to provide alternatives to abortion. Regions governed by
PP approved pro-life laws and policy plans that stated a
public duty to protect the life of the un-born and to set
up a network of assistance to pregnant women in vul-
nerable positions. In these regions, the few economic
resources that were dedicated to gender equality poli-
cies are now destined to policies that depict women as
mothers and to these very same organizations that op-
pose feminist and LGBTI movements (Alonso & Paleo,
2017).4 More importantly, nowadays these groups enjoy
direct access to women seeking advice on their sexual
and reproductive rights, undermining in practice state-
level policies that grant women an informed decision in
a safe environment. The conservative political discourse
on sexual and reproductive rights in Spain’s regions pro-
duces knowledge about traditional gender roles and re-
striction to women’s autonomy, which implies a retroces-
sion for gender equality (Verloo, 2017).
Dynamics of democratization point at the role of po-
litical contestation as vital for democracy (International
Panel on Social Progress, 2016; Walby, 2015). The Indig-
nados movement and the following waves of social and
feminist protest brought back political contestation in
Spain. The emergence of new political parties such as
Podemos and Ciudadanos introduced more pluralism in
the Spanish two-party system of PP and Partido Social-
ista Obrero Español [Socialist Party] (PSOE). The new par-
ties not only allow broader institutional channeling of
citizens’ demands but also demand greater accountabil-
ity to a government used to govern in absolute majority.
The alliance of Podemoswith civic platforms at the 2015
local elections (e.g., Ahora Madrid, Barcelona en Comú)
has allowed people from civil society and not only party
apparatus to enter representative institutions. By open-
ing institutional channels to represent some of the Indig-
nados movement demands (Calvo & Álvarez, 2015), the
new political actors could affect the agenda of civil rights
restrictions of the last decade. One example is the oppo-
sition parties’ proposal of reform of the ‘gag law’ started
in March 2017.
These political changes have had important gender
effects. The representation of women in the 2015 gen-
eral elections was the highest in Spain’s democratic his-
tory, reaching 39.4% in Congress, due to the adoption
of voluntary zipper-system candidate lists in the PSOE,
Podemos, and Izquierda Unida [United Left] (IU) parties
(Lombardo & Verge, 2017). The victory of civic lists in al-
liance with Podemos party in the 2015 local and regional
elections led to the renovation of local governments
through civic lists in towns such asMadrid, Barcelona, Va-
lencia or Santiago. It also provoked the election of female
progressive mayors coming from civil society in Madrid
and Barcelona and the opening of a window of oppor-
tunity for gender equality policies. In the municipal gov-
ernment of Barcelona, for example, a new equality insti-
tution was created, the Department of Feminisms and
LGBTI, led by gender mainstreaming and intersectional-
ity experts. Policies have aimed at counteracting inter-
sectional inequalities that tend to increase in times of
crisis through measures such as the Plan for Gender Jus-
tice (2016–2020) or the Strategy Against the Feminiza-
tion of Poverty and Precariousness (2016–2024) (Lom-
bardo, 2017b). Similarly, new leftist governments in re-
gions like the Balearic Islands and Valencia prioritized re-
instating women’s sexual and reproductive rights and re-
pealed the laws and plans supported by pro-life organi-
zations (Alonso & Paleo, 2017).
4.3. Political Corruption
The post-2008 period is characterized by the rise of cor-
ruption as a key political problem for Spanish democ-
racy. In 2015, the country reached its record and was
placed 41 in the International Transparency’s Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index (0 highly corrupt, 100 very clean).
By that point, scandals involving the main state institu-
tions―from the monarchy to the regional governments
and the main parties—were central to the political de-
bates. National surveys reflected indeed that citizens
placed ‘corruption and fraud’ (42%) and ‘politicians, po-
litical parties, and politics’ (29.9%) as the main prob-
lems of the country just below ‘unemployment’ (69.6%)
(CIS, 2016). Corruption has provoked the most signif-
icant decline of institutional trust amongst European
countries (Torcal, 2014), which affects the three govern-
ment branches. Structural problems of Spanish democ-
racy such as the ‘politicization’ of the judiciary, the lack
of control over party finances or the need for more
transparency policies became more acute (Group of
States against Corruption [GRECO], 2016), gathering at-
tention also from the EU institutions,which included anti-
corruptionmeasures as part of the country’s Stability Pro-
gramme (European Commission, 2017).
This state of affairs has had significant gendered im-
plications. First, the increased perceived level of corrup-
tion has shown remarkable potential to erode the pub-
3 The Spanish Constitution foresees the possibility for citizens to gather a particular number of individual endorsements for the submission of a bill
that would be then debated and considered for approval in Parliament. Pro-life organizations pioneered the use of this participatory device in many
Spanish regions.
4 In the region of Galicia, for instance, pro-life and religious organizations, in 2016, obtained 77% of the funds devoted to the services to support pregnant
women (Alonso & Paleo, 2017).
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lic support for the welfare state. Studies have revealed
that although Spaniards endorse key social policies such
as education and health, they show increasing skepticism
about greater levels of taxation and about public spend-
ing in non-priority areas―where gender equality policies
are likely to be included (Calzada & Del Pino, 2016). Ex-
isting data confirm citizens’ fears over inefficient public
spending. Recent figures by the National Commission for
Market and Competition (CNMC) estimate the impact of
corruption practices related to public procurement on an
extra cost of 47,500 million Euros―around a 4.5% of the
GDP (Navas, 2015).
As the literature predicted, women are less likely
to have access to the clientelist networks involving top
businessmen and politicians. Data gathered by the judi-
ciary confirm that amongst the 1,378 people that were
brought to court between July 2015 and September 2016
in relation to corruption, 77%weremen (General Council
of the Judiciary, 2017).Women not only suffer the effects
of the under-funding of the welfare state, but also lack
access to these male dominated networks, based on ho-
mosocial capital (Bjarnegård, 2013), through which pub-
lic money is (re)located without any democratic scrutiny.
Moreover, these practices of awarding public contracts
in exchange for black money―to illegally fund the party
and/or its members—have serious implications for gen-
der mainstreaming practice. The Spanish equality frame-
work, including the national ‘Law 3/2007 on Effective
Equality betweenMen andWomen’, establishes the duty
of public institutions to enact equality clauses in public
procurement related contracts and regulations. Corrup-
tion has, however, undermined this attempt to incorpo-
rate gender equality measures in the private sector.
As a key preoccupation of the Spanish population,
corruption has also been at the heart of social struggles
for democratization. Fueling the Indignados movement,
whose indignation was targeted at corrupted politicians
that were not perceived as good representatives, it has
inspired political discourses against the establishment.
Indeed, new politics in Spain, both at the right and at
the left, cannot be understood without the allegations
against the old parties―PSOE and PP—and their close
connection to political scandals. Here, Podemos holds
the more critical discourse and places Spain close to a
‘mafia state’, where the institutions have been subordi-
nated to the interests of the PP and the economic elite,
serving as an effective tool for the illicit funding of the
party and its members, and the control over the alloca-
tion of public spending for the benefit of clientelist net-
works. The party has proposed, on 19 May 2017, a vote
of no confidence on the PP government on grounds of
these corrupted practices that disrespect democracy and
increase inequality (Riveiro, 2017). Up to 800 public of-
ficers of PP are currently being sued for corruption, in-
cluding charges based on their participation in organized
crime―in cases such as Gürtel or Púnica (Mira, 2017).
Feminist struggles have not remained aloof to this
key dimension of de-democratization. The women’s
movement enjoyed a leading role in anti-austerity plat-
forms that have defended the public sector from privati-
zations that tend to place public services under the con-
trol of the same companies involved in corrupted prac-
tices (Lombardo, 2017a). Women also actively partici-
pated in civic platforms that contributed to prosecute
these activities such as 15MPa Rato―against corruption
in the finance sector—or the Platform Against the Priva-
tization of the Isabel II Canal―to protect the public wa-
ter supply in Madrid from the embezzlement of public
money. With similar aims, some regional and local gov-
ernments have adopted public procurement regulations
that allowed re-instating gender equality clauses, which
are particularly advanced in termsof gendermainstream-
ing, especially in Basque and Catalan equality institutions
(Diz, 2017).
5. Conclusions
De-democratization processes oppose the feminist
project in Europe. Feminist analyses contribute to dis-
entangle these setbacks, which have significant implica-
tions not only for the procedural and substantive com-
ponents of a deep democracy, but also for the situa-
tion of women in Europe. This article has analyzed the
relation between gender equality and processes of de-
democratization in Spain in the aftermath of the 2008
economic crisis. It argued that neoliberalism, authoritar-
ian shifts and political corruption have been detrimental
to Spanish democracy and gender equality. The subordi-
nation of the common good to the EU neoliberal project,
the limitation of civil rights to freedomof expression,mo-
bilization, and women’s autonomy, breaches to the rule
of law or the embezzling of public money by political au-
thorities undermine procedural and substantive democ-
racy. Such phenomena not only affect the state capacity
of effective democratic control of decision-making and
of putting its results into practice in Tilly’s (2007) terms,
but have significant gendered impacts. These include
the dismantling of key public services, including gender
equality policies, the restriction of women’s sexual and
reproductive rights, and the ineffective implementation
of gender mainstreaming. Combined they have under-
mined progress made in the Spanish equality policy and
legal framework in the previous decade.
However, collective agency has played a key role in
counteracting these dynamics and re-democratizing the
political space in Spain. Civil society and feminist move-
ments’ struggles for democracy, equality and social jus-
tice, have been effective in protecting public services
from privatization, bringing corrupted politicians to jus-
tice or assuring women’s access to safe abortions. They
also triggered the most significant change in the Span-
ish party system in decades, opening opportunities for
the rise of left-wing party Podemos, and especially of
local governments emerging from grass-roots platforms,
which are currently the avant-garde in the implementa-
tion of gender equality policies in Spain. Moreover, gen-
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der equality institutions in some regions have still priori-
tized gender equality despite austerity. The Spanish mul-
tilevel structure provided opportunities to circumvent
the PP majority at the state level (Alonso & Verge, 2014)
and partially reverse the setbacks in gender equality poli-
cies of the last decade.
Collective agency has thus offered political op-
portunities for counteracting opposition to feminism
and putting forward visions of a deep―and feminist—
democracy. Yet, the potential for a deep democracy is
based on the interdependent relation between democ-
racy and gender equality. To be able to express their de-
mocratizing action, feminist and social movements need
rules and practices that do not restrict their rights and
possibilities of political contestation. It is to be seen
whether the dynamics of de- and re-democratization
will safeguard Spanish democracy and gender equality in
these internationally hard times.
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